Since the Texas Supreme Court decided Gregory v. Chohan in June 2023, civil plaintiffs’ lawyers across Texas have been keeping a close eye on how to best prove up noneconomic damages. The Chohan plurality threw cold water on the old “shocks the conscience” standard, rejected “unsubstantiated anchoring” arguments (fighter jets, expensive paintings, cost-per-mile calculations), and held that plaintiffs must demonstrate “a rational connection, grounded in the evidence, between the injuries suffered and the amount awarded.” But the plurality also declined to “place any limits . . . on the reasons by which a plaintiff might justify the amount.”
That ambiguity left a lot of trial lawyers guessing. The Dallas Court of Appeals’ March 26, 2026 decision in SL Nabors Commercial/Residential Roofing, Ltd. v. Allen, No. 05-24-00854-CV, offers a roadmap to proving up noneconomic damages verdict post-Chohan.
What Happened in Nabors
Rico Delmon Allen was injured in a July 19, 2021 car accident caused by an SL Nabors roofing truck. Liability was directed against the defendant at the close of evidence. Nabors conceded it could not present evidence to support submitting a negligence question to the jury. Damages were the only live issue, and the evidence the jury heard was substantial.
Allen went to the emergency room hours after the crash with head, shoulder, and back pain. Two days later, he saw chiropractor Dr. Zachary Weaks and reported neck, back, finger, arm, shoulder, leg, and hip pain along with dizziness, headaches, numbness, and sleep loss. Even with muscle relaxers, Allen rated his back, finger, and arm pain at 10 out of 10, his shoulder and rib pain at 9, and his neck pain at 8. He attended twenty chiropractic visits over approximately eleven months. At his final evaluation, he still reported severe difficulty with overhead reaching, household chores, making a bed, carrying anything over ten pounds, and washing his back.
Allen completed detailed Neck and Back Indices documenting the functional consequences. He rated his sleep as “completely disturbed” with 5-7 hours of sleeplessness, reported being unable to lift or carry anything, experiencing pain that restricted his social life to his home, and suffering moderate headaches that came frequently. An MRI revealed disk protrusion at C-3 and C-4 with potential narrowing of the spinal canal. Dr. Zeshan Chaudhry diagnosed cervical and lumbar facet mediated pain and performed three fluoroscopy-guided steroid injections between May and September 2022. Allen stayed awake for each injection because one of his “biggest fears in life” was going under anesthesia and “not waking up to see my kids.” Each injection cost $7,950. He described them as “the worst thing ever.” He also underwent shoulder surgery to repair a torn labrum.
Both treating physicians testified the damage was permanent. Dr. Chaudhry explained that a herniated disk will not heal itself and is “forever compromised in terms of its integrity.” Dr. Brett Boeke, Allen’s chiropractic expert, testified that the injury “actually ages the disks much more” and expected Allen to be susceptible to future injuries and to “need pretty constant pain meds” for the rest of his life.
The real-world consequences were equally concrete. Allen’s annual income dropped from roughly $80,000 to $40,000 after he was forced to leave field sales work for a call center and then bounce between unstable jobs. His mother moved in to help raise his two young children because pain medication left him “groggy and sleepy.” He stopped coaching his son’s basketball team. He could not help his kids with homework because sitting and reading for extended periods gave him headaches. He was evicted because he could not afford the payments. His marriage ended; he testified his injuries “basically shut the door” on the relationship. He testified that the accident “drained” him mentally and that he lost his faith. He was 44 years old at trial.
Worth noting is what Allen’s counsel did not do, because SL Nabors argued on appeal that some of it was required post-Chohan. Allen’s counsel did not offer a per-diem calculation like the $16-per-day figure approved in Garza or the $25-per-day National Guard wage anchor approved in Elizondo. He did not multiply a daily dollar figure by Allen’s days of suffering or by his remaining life expectancy. He did not present expert testimony assigning a specific dollar value to Allen’s pain, mental anguish, or loss of enjoyment of life. He did not introduce evidence quantifying what amount of money would enable Allen to better cope with his injuries or restore his emotional health, one of the examples the Chohan plurality offered as a potential rational basis. SL Nabors argued this absence was fatal, that without a mathematical formula or quantifying expert, the jury was left to “simply pick a number and put it in the blank.” The Dallas Court disagreed, and that disagreement is the core of why this opinion matters.
On this record, the jury awarded Allen:
- $250,000 for past physical pain and mental anguish
- $100,000 for future physical pain and mental anguish
- $200,000 for past physical impairment
- $115,000 for future physical impairment
- $188,743.73 for past medical care
- $200,000 for future medical care
- $25,000 for past loss of earning capacity
SL Nabors appealed, challenging the noneconomic damages and future medical expenses as legally and factually insufficient. The Dallas Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Justice Barbare, affirmed the damages awards in full.
The Court’s Analysis and Why It Matters
The Framework the Court Applied
The court restated the Chohan test cleanly. To survive a legal-sufficiency challenge to noneconomic damages, a plaintiff must show:
- The existence of compensable mental anguish: evidence of the “nature, duration, and severity” of the anguish suffered, and
- A rational connection, grounded in the evidence, between the injuries suffered and the amount awarded.
If “the reason offered in justification of the amount awarded is rational and does not partake of prohibited motives, courts should defer to the factfinder’s verdict.”
That framing matters. The Chohan plurality set up a two-part test, and Nabors shows us what a successful plaintiff’s showing looks like under each prong.
Prong One: Existence of Compensable Mental Anguish
The evidence Allen marshaled was thorough and specific, the kind of record that makes prong one straightforward.
Medical evidence with specificity. Allen immediately sought emergency care the day of the accident. Two days later, he was examined by a chiropractor and reported pain at specific numerical levels on a 1-to-10 scale for eight separate body regions. He completed Neck and Back Indices with numerical ratings for specific functional limitations, including sleep disruption, inability to lift, inability to concentrate, and restriction of social life to the home. He had twenty chiropractic visits over eleven months. He underwent an MRI that revealed disk protrusion at C-3 and C-4. He received three fluoroscopy-guided facet joint steroid injections, staying awake because his “biggest fear in life” was not waking from anesthesia, not waking up to see his kids. He had shoulder surgery to repair a labrum tear.
Testimony about real-world impact. Allen’s income dropped from roughly $80,000 to $40,000 a year. He lost his job as a field sales representative and had to move to a call center. He was eventually evicted. His marriage ended. His mother moved in to help care for his two young children because pain medication left him groggy. He stopped coaching his son’s basketball team. He could no longer help his kids with homework because sitting and reading for that long gave him headaches.
Medical opinion on permanence. Dr. Chaudhry explained that a herniated disk will not heal itself and is “forever compromised.” Dr. Boeke testified Allen would be susceptible to future injuries and would “need pretty constant pain meds.”
This is the “nature, duration, and severity” evidence Chohan demands, and the Dallas court had no trouble finding it legally and factually sufficient.
Prong Two: The Rational Connection
Here’s where the opinion becomes genuinely useful. Allen’s counsel did two things at closing that the court explicitly credited:
- He suggested specific ranges anchored to the evidence. Counsel suggested “at least $500,000” for past physical pain and mental anguish and between $200,000 and $250,000 for future physical pain and suffering.
- He tied those numbers to an identifiable rationale: “lost time,” memories “you don’t get back,” “things that are sticking with him for the rest of his life.”
The jury then awarded less than counsel requested: $250,000 for past pain and mental anguish (half of the suggested $500,000) and $100,000 for future (below the suggested $200,000 to $250,000 range).
The court made that point explicitly: “The jury’s awards were less than the recommended ranges by Allen’s attorney in closing argument; therefore, the jury did not ‘simply pick a number and put it in a blank,’ as SL Nabors argues.” The court cited the Dallas Court’s own post-Chohan decision in Bilal v. Khan, where a $140,000 past mental anguish award was upheld in part because it was “far less than the $1.75 million the plaintiff asked the jury to award.”
The practical takeaway for plaintiffs’ lawyers: a rational suggested range, tied to evidence, that comes in higher than what the jury ultimately awards, gives reviewing courts a concrete way to find the “rational connection” Chohan requires.
The Other Cases: Garza and Elizondo
The Nabors court then surveyed what other Texas appellate courts have done post-Chohan, and this is where the opinion becomes especially valuable as a roadmap.
Garza v. Escamilla, 712 S.W.3d 718 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, no pet.)
In Garza, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals upheld noneconomic damages where plaintiff’s counsel offered the jury a “simple calculation”: sixteen dollars per day, or one dollar for every waking hour in the day during which the plaintiff experienced loss. That per-unit anchor, tied to the plaintiff’s lived experience rather than to extrinsic values like fighter jets, passed muster.
Elizondo v. Reyna, No. 04-24-00284-CV, 2025 WL 2462764 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 27, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.)
In Elizondo, the San Antonio Court approved a more sophisticated per-day calculation. Counsel suggested $25 per day, an amount the evidence showed was approximately one hour of National Guard pay, multiplied by the 1,625 days between the crash and closing argument, for past mental anguish and past physical impairment. For future damages, counsel used $10 to $20 per day multiplied by the plaintiff’s 11,680-day remaining life expectancy.
Notice what made these calculations work. They weren’t pulled from nothing. The Garza dollar-per-waking-hour was anchored to the plaintiff’s daily experience. The Elizondo $25-per-day was anchored to an hour of the plaintiff’s actual wage. Neither was the kind of “unsubstantiated anchoring” Chohan rejected. Neither was analogized to a fighter jet, a Rothko painting, or the defendant’s revenue.
The Critical Caveat: Per-Diem Calculations Are Not Required
Here is the point plaintiffs’ lawyers most need to internalize from Nabors. After discussing Garza and Elizondo, the Dallas Court wrote:
“However, to the extent SL Nabors argues that suggested calculations are required to withstand a sufficiency challenge, we do not interpret Gregory as changing the law to require such evidence to uphold non-economic damage awards. Rather, these cases illustrate one method by which a plaintiff may assist the jury in calculating damages.”
This matters enormously. Some commentators read Chohan as essentially mandating a mathematical formula, that plaintiffs now had to break down noneconomic damages into per-day, per-hour, or per-event units to survive appellate review. Nabors says no. A per-diem or unit-based calculation is one permissible way to create a rational connection, not the only way.
In Nabors itself, Allen’s counsel did not use a per-diem calculation. He suggested ranges tied to themes, including lost memories, lost time, and lifelong consequences, and the court held that sufficient because the reasons given were “rational and grounded in the evidence.”
Physical Impairment: The Same Framework Applies
The court’s analysis of the $200,000 past and $115,000 future physical impairment awards tracked the same approach. Physical impairment, sometimes called loss of enjoyment of life, must be “substantial and extend beyond any pain, suffering, and mental anguish.” The evidence here showed exactly that:
- Allen had coached his son’s basketball team; he stopped two years before trial
- He played soccer with his daughter; “on pause”
- Family bowling and swimming trips; no longer possible
- He couldn’t lift his own son due to pain
- He felt he was “letting down his children”
The court applied the same Chohan framework and found the rational connection between evidence and dollar amount. Notably, the charge included a specific instruction that the jury should not “twice compensate” for the same loss. The court presumed the jury followed that instruction.
Future Medical Expenses: A Separate Standard, but Parallel Reasoning
Future medical expenses are governed by a different doctrinal test than noneconomic damages, but the court’s treatment is instructive. A plaintiff must show a “reasonable probability” that future expenses will be necessary. Expert testimony is preferred but not required.
The $200,000 future medical award was supported by:
- Dr. Chaudhry and Dr. Boeke both testifying future care was likely
- $188,743.73 in past medical expenses (unchallenged) over three years
- Each steroid injection cost $7,950; Allen had three pretrial
- Allen testified he had not sought further treatment because he could not afford it
- He wanted mental health counseling he had not been able to access
- He was 44 at trial, with a long life ahead
The court noted the jury awarded only about $11,000 more for future medical than past, a modest extrapolation from the proven three-year cost. That’s exactly the kind of evidence-grounded reasoning that survives appellate review.
What This Means for Plaintiffs’ Lawyers: Practical Takeaways
For the trial bar reading this case after Chohan, a few things crystallize.
First, build the “nature, duration, and severity” record with specificity. Generalized testimony about sadness and hardship will not carry the day. Numerical pain ratings, functional indices, specific activities the client can no longer do, specific relationships damaged, specific opportunities lost: that’s the foundation. Nabors shows how much detail is enough.
Second, the anchor in closing argument matters, and it must be tied to the evidence. Fighter jets, paintings, and cost-per-mile arguments are dead. But per-diem calculations anchored to the client’s actual experience (Garza), per-hour calculations tied to the client’s actual wages (Elizondo), or suggested ranges tied to thematic descriptions of loss (Nabors) all work.
Third, ask for more than you expect, but not absurdly more. Courts have repeatedly cited the fact that jury awards came in below plaintiff’s requests as evidence the jury engaged in rational deliberation. A suggested range that is itself grounded in the evidence, with the jury coming in lower, is the strongest post-Chohan record.
Fourth, connect the dollars to the evidence thematically. Even without a per-diem calculation, counsel in Nabors tied the requested number to identifiable concepts: memories lost, lifelong consequences, time that cannot be recovered. Those are not “unsubstantiated anchors.” They are articulated reasons grounded in the plaintiff’s testimony.
Fifth, preserve the physical impairment distinction. Physical impairment is a separate element of damages that “encompasses the loss of the injured party’s former lifestyle.” Develop the evidence of lifestyle loss, including hobbies, family activities, coaching, and parenting limitations, as a distinct category from pain and mental anguish, and make sure the charge preserves the distinction.
A Note on Verdict Comparisons
One method not at issue in Nabors, but flagged by the Chohan plurality in footnote 12, is verdict comparison, the practice of justifying a noneconomic damages amount by reference to amounts awarded in factually similar cases. The Chohan plurality did “not foreclose the possibility that comparison to other cases may play some role in a plaintiff’s effort to establish that a given amount of noneconomic damages is reasonable and just compensation rationally grounded in the evidence.” The plurality declined to “define the permissible uses of verdict comparisons.” The Nabors court did not address this method because Allen’s counsel did not use it, and SL Nabors did not argue its absence was fatal. Plaintiffs’ lawyers considering a verdict-comparison approach should watch for the first Texas appellate opinion to engage with the method substantively, because until then, the metes and bounds of permissible comparison remain open.
What This Means for Lay Readers
If you’re reading this as someone who has been injured or who has lost a loved one, here’s the plain-English version. Texas used to ask appellate courts a fuzzy question about noneconomic damages: “Does this number shock the conscience?” The Texas Supreme Court in 2023 said that question was too elastic and demanded something more rigorous, a rational reason, grounded in the evidence, for the dollar amount awarded.
That ruling was widely perceived as a blow to injured plaintiffs because it overturned a $15 million wrongful death verdict. But Nabors shows that plaintiffs can absolutely still win substantial noneconomic damages awards post-Chohan. They just have to build the record carefully and argue the dollar amount to the jury in a principled way. A plaintiff with detailed medical records, specific functional limitations, credible testimony about lifestyle loss, and a lawyer who ties the requested dollar amount to the evidence in closing can expect the verdict to hold up on appeal.
Bottom Line
Nabors is the decision plaintiffs’ lawyers have been waiting for. It affirms that:
- Substantial noneconomic damages (here, $665,000 across four categories) can survive Chohan review
- Per-diem or unit-based calculations (Garza, Elizondo) are permitted but not required
- A principled suggested range, tied to themes grounded in the evidence, with the jury awarding less than requested, creates the “rational connection” Chohan demands
- Detailed medical evidence, functional indices, and specific testimony about lost activities and relationships build the foundation
For lawyers preparing the next wave of personal injury trials in Texas, Nabors deserves careful study alongside Chohan, Bilal, Cannon, Garza, and Elizondo. Read together, they sketch out a workable post-Chohan playbook, one that respects the Supreme Court’s demand for rationality while preserving juries’ traditional role in translating human suffering into compensation.
